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ALL ALASKAN SEAFOODS, INC. v. MN SEA PRODUCER 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 14 August 1989 
88 2 F.2d 425 
Claims for cargo damage against a ship as a common carrier can give rise to tort liability irrespective of contract 
obligations between the parties thereby entitling the claim to priority over a preferred ship's mortgage as a maritime lien. 
The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act does not apply by its own force to the contract between two parties when the contract is 
for carriage between two domestic ports. 
FACTS: In October, 1986, All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., ("All 
Alaskan") commenced an action against the M/V Sea Producer 
("Sea Producer") and its operator, Express Marine Transportation 
Co., ("Express Marine") for cargo damage. All Alaskan alleged 
in its complaint, that it suffered losses totalling an estimated 
$1.5 million when its shipment of frozen king crab thawed while 
en route from Molar, Alaska to Seattle, Washington. In addition, 
the shipment of king crab was contaminated by a refrigerant 
leakage in the hold of the Sea Producer. All Alaskan further 
alleged that the losses it suffered were caused by the negligence 
of Express Marine. 
In April, 1987, People's National Bank of Washington ("People's") 
seeking to foreclose a preferred ship's mortgage on the Sea 
Producer intervened in the action. All Alaskan and People's 
filed cross motions, before discovery had commenced for partial 
summary judgment to establish priority of their respective liens 
against the vessel. All Alaskan's motion was denied; however, 
the district court granted partial summary judgment for 
People's Bank. The court held that All Alaskan's maritime lien 
on the Sea Producer was subordinate to People's ship's mortgage. 
The court concluded that under the Ship Mortgage Act, All 
Alaskan's claim for cargo damage sounded only in contract and 
not in tort, and therefore All Alaskan's claim was not entitled to 
priority as a maritime lien under 46 U.S.C. §953 (a)(2). All 
Alaskan appeals this judgment. 
Although All Alaskan concedes that the order at issue is in­
terlocutory in that its claims and those of People's mortgage 
remain unadjudicated on the merits. It contends that appellate 
jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(3). Appellees 
People's urge the court to reject jurisdiction relying on the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Seattle-First National Bank u. Bluewater 
Partnership, 772 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1985). 
All Alaskan also asks the court to rule, based on the evidence 
presented to the district court, that the Sea Producer was a 
common carrier and that the duty of due diligence codified in the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"J, 46 U.S.C. §§1300-
1315, applies by its own force to the contract between Express 
Marine and All Alaskan. 
ISSUES: ( 1) Was the granting of the partial summary judg­
ment to People's appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1292 (a)( 3l? 
(2) Did the district court err in ruling, as a matter of 
law, that All Alaskan's claim for cargo damage could only sound 
in contract and as a result would not be entitled to priority under 
the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §953 (a)(2J? 
( 3) Was the Sea Producer a common carrier within the 
meaning of COGSA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315? 
ANALYSIS: The Ninth Circuit, in concluding that the district 
court's partial summary judgment on the issue of lien priority 
was appealable, rejected appellees' reliance on this court's ruling 
in Seattle-First National Bank u. Bluewater Partnership, 772 
F.2d 565 ( 9th Cir. 1985). Bluewater Partnership also involved a 
challenge by lien claimants as to the validity of the preferred 
ship's mortgage held by Seattle-First National Bank. In deny­
ing appellate jurisdiction, the court pointed out that the 
challenge as to the validity of Seattle-First National Bank's 
mortgage was still pending following the interlocutory order 
and as a result the district court's liens priority determination 
could not have been final as to any of the lien claimants. 
Here, however, although the parties seek their relative 
priorities as lien claimants, the validity of the People's preferred 
ship's mortgage is unchallenged and there are no claims between 
All-Alaskan and People's against one another. The district 
court's partial summary judgment conclusively determined 
that priority of All Alaskan's lien by classifying it as a con­
tractual lien, and thus not entitled to priority under 46 U.S.C. 
§953 (a)(2). 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district 
court's partial summary judgment is appealable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292 (a)(3) which grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction of 
appeals from: "(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts 
or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the 
parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees 
are allowed." 
All Alaskan's motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
lien priority alleged that the damage to its shipment resulted 
from the negligent operation of the Sea Producer as a common 
carrier. All Alaskan's cargo damage claim, then, would give rise 
to a tort lien which is superior, under the Ship Mortgage Act, to 
the preferred ship's mortgage held by People's. 
The district court considered the contractual relationship bet­
ween All Alaskan and Express Marine to preclude a maritime 
lien for damages premised on tort liability. However, following 
the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Oriente Com'l u. American 
Flag Vessel, M/V Floridian, 529 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1975), 
neither the weight of authority nor the language of the Ship 
Mortgage Act justified the district court's decision. The Ninth 
· Circuit found that if Express Marine breached its duty with 
respect to All Alaskan, then that breach of duty can give rise to 
· tort liability irrespective of contract obligations between the 
parties. Although the district court was guided by important 
policy considerations, such as refusing to undercut the purpose 
of the Ship Mortgage Act (encouraging investment in the ship­
ping industry), the Ninth Circuit held that it was an error for 
the lower court to rule, as matter of law, that All Alaskan's 
cargo claim could not sound in tort. Therefore, the district 
court's holding of partial summary judgment was reversed and 
the case was remanded so that the district court could determine 
the merits of All Alaskan's tort claim. 
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Finally, All Alaskan asked the court to rule that the Sea 
Producer was a common carrier and thus that the duty of due 
diligence codified in COGSA applies by its own force to the 
contract between Express Marine and All Alaskan. The court 
notes that COGSA would not, in fact, apply to the contract 
between the two parties because the contract was for carriage 
between two domestic ports. The federal statute governing bills 
of lading between two domestic ports is the Harter Act, 46 U .S.C. 
§§ 190-196. This statute would apply in the absence of an express 
agreement between the parties. The court concluded that even if 
Express marine was not a common carrier for the purpose of this 
shipment, and that no federal statute applied, the parties could 
have incorporated a statutory standard by expressly adopting it 
in their contract. The Ninth Circuit held that these issues would 
be decided by the district court on remand. 
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